I. Introduction
The literature provides two alternative hypotheses regarding the relationship between bank competition and its stability or risk-taking behavior. According to the conventional competition-fragility theory, the higher competition in the financial industry causes financial institutions to lose their market powers, leading to a decrease in their profitability. In order to recover from financial losses, financial institutions are more likely to invest in riskier portfolios. Consequently, this risk-taking behavior will undermine the stability of financial institutions (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2000; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000, etc.) .
Competition-stability theory, on the other hand, suggests that competition has a potentially positive effect on the stability of financial institutions. According to Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) , banks with greater market share in the loan market which experience lower competition tend to impose higher interest rates on their loans. The greater interest burdens charged by banks in a less competitive market may increase the risk-taking behavior of borrowing firms. Boyd and De Nicolo consequently argue that since the risk is ultimately shifted from borrowers to banks, the default probability of banks increases in the riskiness of bank loans.
So far, however, empirical research has produced mixed results on the influence of bank competition on its stability. Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012) who use bank data in Latin American banks support, in part, the competition-fragility theory, yet document the U-shaped relationship between competition and stability. They find that bank stability is improved at the high and low levels of competition while moderate competition significantly increases the risk of banks. On the other hand, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) support the risk-shifting effect in the study of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) in that greater interest rates in less competitive markets raise the risk of loans and thus make a bank bankruptcy more likely. They, however, additionally take into account the fact that greater interest rates also improve bank profitability, called the interest effect, and suggest the nonlinear relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. We discuss the relevant literature in greater detail in section II-2.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate a relationship between competition and stability by using the sample of two different types of banks: mutual savings banks (MSBs, hereafter) and commercial banks. While previous studies provide theoretical and empirical links between bank competition and stability, there have been few studies stability which can capture how distant a certain bank is from its insolvency. Finally, we perform pooling regressions as well as panel analyses to examine the relationship between competitive levels and the stability of MSBs and commercial banks. Section III describes our measures and methodology in more details.
Our empirical results generally support the hypothesis that the effect of bank competition on its stability is different depending on the characteristics of financial institutions. The results of our multiple regressions show that competition has a significant and positive effect on the stability of MSBs with weak corporate governance.
On the contrary, competition pressure significantly reduces the stability of commercial banks but, consistent with Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012) , the relationship turns out to be nonlinear. The results are robust across alternative proxies for competition and stability as well as various model specifications. Therefore, we conclude that for commercial banks higher competition creates the trade-off between the risk-shifting effect and interest effect, but the risk shifting effect overwhelms the interest effect for MSBs when the market is less competitive. This paper contributes in several ways. To our knowledge, our research is among the first to provide comprehensive evidence on the relationship between bank competition and stability, conditional on different bank characteristics. The paper furthers our understanding of the influence of bank competition on its stability by showing that competition significantly decreases risk-taking behaviors of MSBs with weaker corporate governance and greater business risk, while it has a nonlinear relationship for commercial banks. Moreover, it is the first paper to analyze Korean MSBs by using hand-collected data. So far, there is no published empirical research examining MSBs due to the lack of available data because most of them are non-listed. 3) Finally, while the previous literature uses annual financial data in its analysis, we intend to provide more reliable results from our empirical tests by using quarterly financial data, which enables us to analyze a larger number of observations. We should, however, be clear about the limitation of our paper. Due to the lack of detailed information on corporate governance of MSBs, the paper does not address how the corporate governance mechanism of banks affects the relationship between competition and stability, which we leave for the future research.
3) As of year 2011, only 7 out of 105 MSBs were listed in the Korean exchange. But, only one bank, Pureun savings bank is listed in 2013 due to the continuing delisting of other listed MSBs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is the literature review of related area.
In Section III, we describe our sample and empirical methodology. Section IV analyzes the relationship between competition and stability, while Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review 1. Estimation of competition
An increasing number of studies attempt to estimate a competitiveness level in the banking industry. Given that competition cannot be measured directly, a number of indirect measurement techniques have been developed, largely divided into the structure-conduct-performance (SCP ) and competition-contestability approaches. The structural methods to assess the competitive level in the banking industry are based on the SCP assumption which predicts that the number of banks and their market shares determine the competitive behavior of financial institutions. According to this approach, the greater market concentration decreases the competitive level. The conventionally and frequently used measures include the concentration ratio (, hereafter) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (, hereafter) .   which is defined as the market share held by top  banks and  which is calculated by squaring the market shares of all  banks and summing the squares are as follows.
The U.S. Department of Justice and FTC (Federal Trade Commission) consider a market with less than 1,500 to be a competitive market place, 1,500~2,500 to be a moderately concentrated market place, and 2,500 or higher to be a highly concentrated market place. 4) Contrary to the SCP paradigm, the non-structural approach based on the 4) The market is perfectly competitive if  is 100. See "Horizontal Merger Guidelines" (Aug. 19, 2010, U.S. Department of Justice and FTC).
competition-contestability theory does not assume, a priori, that concentrated markets are less competitive. It suggests that, in the absence of entry barrier, the markets where a small number of firms serve can be nevertheless characterized by competitive equilibrium because of potential short-term entrants (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982; among others) . This non-structural approach directly measures bank competitiveness without considering the type of market structure. Rosse (1982, 1987) 
Where   is the price of input  and  represents the total revenue. The marginal revenue function is assumed to have a log-linear form as follows.
Where , , and  are the prices of three input factors; labor, physical capital, and human capital, and  denotes firm-specific control factors.
 is defined by the sum of input price elasticity (        ) and reflects the competitive structure of the market. Panzar and Rosse prove that the negative  represents a classical monopolist or collusive oligopolist,  between 0 and 1 represents a monopolistic competitor, and a unit  represents a competitive price-taker. While
Panzar and Rosse's  statistics has been widely employed in the empirical literature (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; De Bandt and Davis, 2000 ; among others), Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) point out that the competitive level based on the  is systematically overestimated and that the tests on both monopoly and perfect competition are biased, due to the use of revenues over total assets as a dependent variable instead of un-scaled bank revenues. Moreover, since the model, by its definition, estimates an  -statistics for the whole sample period, it is inappropriate for researchers who attempt to measure the competition structure on the annual or quarterly basis. estimates the level of bank competition by investigating the relationship between bank performance and efficiency measured as marginal costs.
According to Boone, when the market becomes more competitive, efficient firms are rewarded more and inefficient firms are punished more harshly than they are in the less competitive market. Hence, Boone calculates the competitive levels by estimating the elasticity of a firm's performance, in terms of market shares, with respect to its marginal costs as follows.
 denotes the market shares in the loans or total assets of bank  and  is the marginal costs. The estimated coefficient  is interpreted as the profit elasticity, called
Boone index, which is negative, i.e. banks with greater marginal costs lose market shares. Since competition enhances this negative relationship, the greater is the bank competition, the more negative is the Boone index.
Since marginal costs are not directly observed, empirical studies approximate them by calculating average variable costs (Schaeck and Cihak, 2010) or by using a translog cost function (Leuvensteijin, Bikker, Rixtel, and Sorensen, 2011) . In our paper, we follow Leuvensteijin et al. and estimate the following cost function.
Where  is bank operating expenses,  is outputs including total loans (  ), total securities (  ), and non-interest income (  ). The  represents inputs including the prices or costs of labor (  ), of funding capital (  ), and of physical capital (  ). For convenience, the above function omits bank  and time . By taking the first derivative of the translog cost function with respect to total loans, we obtain the marginal costs of loans as follows.
Bank competition and stability
Theoretical models and empirical results on the relationship between bank competition and stability provide conflicting evidence. According to the competitionfragility view, a greater competitive level in the banking industry leads to more fragility.
On the other hand, since banks have the numerous lending opportunities and increase profits and capital ratios in a less competitive market, they can withstand any economic shocks and are less likely to take excessive risk. Keeley (1990) developed a theoretical model which predicts that banks with more pressures on their profits have higher incentives to take more excessive risk which results in a greater probability of their defaults. Allen and Gale (2000) reported that the number of competitors in the loan markets has a positive effect of bank defaults. Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) examined the relationship between competition for deposits, risk taking and regulation in a dynamic framework. They argue that the removal of interest ceilings on deposits erodes franchise value and motivates moral hazard behavior by banks. The framework of these models is characterized by the fact that bank competition is modeled on the liability side and asset allocation decisions are modeled on the asset side which is not affected by bank competition.
Recent papers, on the other hand, take into account the relationship between banks and borrowers on the asset side of banks. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) , in their theoretical model, assume that borrowing firms entirely determine the risk of projects in the condition of the loan rates set by banks. The paper supports the competition-stability hypothesis by showing that greater concentration (less competition) causes banks to become riskier because the higher loan rate charged by banks with less competition implies the greater bankruptcy risk for borrowing firms. The empirical study by Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) who measure market structure by concentration indicators shows that, consistent with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) , the probability of bank failure increases in the level of concentration in the bank industry. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) shows that competition significantly decreases bank stability in countries with stronger activity restrictions and more homogenous market environments. They also find that the deposit insurance policy and efficiency of credit information sharing are the important determinants. Finally, Liu and Wilson (2011) examine whether the effect of competition on stability varies depending on the characteristics of banks in the Japanese market. They find that competition enhances the stability of banks with lower stability level, but damages the stability of banks with higher stability levels. The proportion of loans whose credit rating is B-rated and above, in general considered relatively good, is only 20% of total corporate loans. It has been documented that the Korea. Since the data from the DART and ECOS is not sufficient for our analyses, we collect the data based on the report of each MSB. Even though most of empirical studies on the banking competition use the annual financial data, we use the quarterly data, which enables us to provide more reliable results. 
Mutual savings banks and commercial banks in Korea

Methodology
We estimate the following regression models in order to examine the effect of bank competition on stability.
Our measures for Stability and Competition are discussed in more details below.  is a set of control variables including bank-specific and market-related variables. We conduct both OLS and panel analyses to estimate the equations.
Following Laeven and Levine (2009), Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) and many others, we use the    as a measure of bank stability. The    is defined as the sum of the ROAs and capital ratios divided by the standard deviation of ROAs.
         
We calculate the    by using the ROAs for prior 4 quarters as well as prior 8
quarters. The    which measures how distant a bank from insolvency is inversely proportional to the probability of bank defaults. That is, the greater    represents a lower bankruptcy risk.
Our key measure of bank competition is the Boone index discussed in Section II-1.
More specifically, we estimate the Boone index for the entire sample period as well as for the specific quarter.
In the first regression, the Boone index for the period of 1999-2011 is obtained. In the second regression, we interact the Boone index with quarterly time dummies and control for the quarter effect. The estimation of the Boone index for each quarter is a result of this specification. The market share is mainly based on total assets and total loans, but also calculated with respect to total household loans and commercial loans.
The negative Boone index suggests that an increase in marginal costs decreases market shares and thus competitive pressure does in fact exist in the banking financial industry.
In order to make it directly proportional to the level of competition, we employ the opposite of the Boone index (Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro, 2012) . We also use a dummy which takes a value of 1 for the significantly negative Boone index and 0, otherwise, as a proxy for competition.
The conventional measures for market concentration such as  and , described in Section II-1, are also employed as supplementary measures for competition.  is defined as the sum of market shares of the N largest banks in the market, while  is calculated by squaring the market share of each bank and then summing the squares.
Although there is no rule for the determination of the number of  ,   and   are most frequently used. Based on the previous literature, we include the bank size (Ln (Assets)), profitability (Profit ratio), loan-deposit ratio (Loan to Deposit), and commercialhousehold loan ratio (Commercial to Home loan) as control variables in our regression models. We also include the fluctuation of CD rates (CD Volatility) in order to control for the effect of market situations. Additionally, the variable controls for the effect of business and financial cycles. We think that it is a better choice than the variable of GDP because the volatility of interest rates generally reflects both real economy and financial situations. Furthermore, if both of them employed, multicollinearity may affect our regressions. Also, banking industry tends to be more influenced by interest rates.
Notably, most lending interest rates are linked to CD rates. In order to construct panel data, which enable us to examine how bank competition affects the stability of individual financial institutions, we estimate Boone indices on a quarter basis. In Table 3 6) Although the distribution of Boone index on a household loan basis is not reported in Table 3 , it is similar to the total loan case. Particularly, the degree of competition (Boone index) in the household loan case turns out to be stronger than that of total loan case. Meanwhile, comparing household loans with corporate lending (commercial loans), we find that competition in household loans is more significant and larger during the period from 2005 to 2007. 7) According to our analyses on the difference between commercial loans and household loans for MSBs, the degree of competition (Boone index) in commercial loans turns out to be larger than that of household loans in mid 2000s. This implies that MSBs extended real estate PF loans more competitively than household loans at that time, compared to domestic commercial banks. 
IV. Empirical Results
Analysis of market competition
The coefficient ( ) stands for the Boone index. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Competition and stability in the MSB industry
Before conducting regression analyses, we first take an initial look at correlations between independent variables. By obtaining the correlation coefficients between such figures, we should be aware of potential multicollinearity. As reported in Table 4 , in the MSB sample, all the correlation coefficients except for that (0.573) between competition and Inverse of Boone Index 8) are relatively very low. In the commercial bank case, also, all the coefficients except for it (0.894) are not high. As a result, we conclude that the correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are rather small and thus muticollinearity may not affect the results of our regressions. Using the Boone indices and concentration measures estimated in the previous sections, we examine the effect of competition on stability in the MSB industry. We conduct OLS regressions as a baseline-model as well as panel analysis to control for time invariant heterogeneity of each bank. Table 5 that the probability of MSB defaults are lower in the competitive market, consistent with our hypothesis that higher interest rates charged by MSBs in a less competitive market would increase the risk-taking behavior of borrowers, most of whom are SMEs possessing greater business and credit risk (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005) . In the words of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) , the risk shifting effect overwhelms the interest effect for MSBs when the market is less competitive or more concentrated.
Note that most of the coefficients of our control variables are signed in accordance with our expectations and prior literature. The profit ratio is positively correlated with MSB stability. The loan to deposit ratio increases the stability of MSBs but the negative effect of the squared loan to deposit ratio suggests that its increasing rate in fact decreases.
Market volatility, measured by CD volatility, significantly increases the defaults of MSBs. [-3 .29]*** -0.0002 [-3 .03]*** -0.0003 [-1 [-2 .95]*** -0.2921 [-4 .98]*** -0.1878 [-2 .64]*** -0.2785 [-3 .81]*** Intercept -1.7630 [-3 .04]*** -1.5559 [-2 .62]*** -2.5086 [-1 .25] -1.1059 [-0.55] [-4 .43]*** -0.1685 [-2 .36]** -0.2626 [-3 .61]*** Intercept -2.8477 [-4 .37]*** -2.6309 [-4 .05]*** -5.6183 [-2 .89]*** -3.5127 [-1.95 (Panel B) quarters. All tests use robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The descriptions of variables are provided in the third part of Table 1 .
In Table 6 , we additionally investigate a relationship between concentration and stability in the MSB market. Also, we intend to consider the fact that the MSB industry has faced serious default problems of existing loans (for example, real estate PF loans) under the low competitive environment since the recent global financial crisis because of the sluggishness in real estate markets. 9) At that time, many MSBs failed to find new profit sources and therefore bank competition did not be strongly formed. According to 9) We intend to investigate concentration risk indirectly through these analyses. Many MSBs extended their real estate PF loans competitively during the housing boom, notably from 2005 to 2007. This can be found in Table 3 . As a result of the competitive relationship in the past, some large-sized MSBs (for example, Busan mutual savings banks) became to hold most of total real estate PF loans. 29 MSBs with total asset one trillion won occupied around 80% of all MSBs' PF loans (12.3 trillion won) in end-2010 . At that time, the total number of MSBs was 105 banks and the proportion of large-sized MSBs (29 banks) with total asset one trillion won was 27.6% of all MSBs. Therefore, the concentration degree in the MSB industry had gone up sharply until 2010. Subsequently, default risks have increased around those MSBs with higher PF loans. 20 banks were ordered to suspend business between 2011 and 2012. During this period, Korean construction business and housing markets continued on a downward trend. Deeply influenced by these situations, many MSBs suffered from difficulties. A series of these phenomena imply that higher concentration in the MSB industry whose customers are mainly composed of low-rated and vulnerable borrowers may lead to raising default risks at the time of business recession. In particular, since some MSBs were exposed excessively to real estate PF loans, they could not help but be more influenced by business cycle.
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP ) view, the number of firms and their market shares determine the competitive level of the industry.  and , discussed in Section III-2, are used as proxies of market concentration and, more specifically,   and   represent the concentration ratio by top four and eight banks, respectively. As in the previous Table 5 , we use the    as the dependent variables and estimate OLS and fixed effects regressions. The results of Table 6 show that the coefficients for the concentration measure are significantly negative, consistent with the results in Table 5 .
In general, greater concentration ratios imply less competitive markets. We, however, find that the squared terms of concentration ratios are positively correlated with the    , which suggests that the relationship between market concentration and MSB stability is in fact nonlinear. The coefficients of control variables are signed consistently with the previous table. 
CR4
-0.1288 [-7 .38] *** -1.8701 [-2 .25] ** -0.1735 [-4 [-6 .22] *** -0.5760 [-7 .15] *** -0.0160 [-3 .39] *** -0.5849 [-6 .38] [-3 .53] *** -0.0002 [-3 .44] *** -0.0002 [-3 .48] *** -0.0002 [-3 .07] *** -0.0003 [-1 [-3 .61] *** -0.1797 [-2 .80] *** -0.2502 [-4 .12] *** -0.0681 [-1 .04] -0.2407 [-3 .35] *** -0.1824 [-2 .66] *** -0.2610 [-3 .61] *** -0.0748 [-1.12 [-7 .10]*** -0.1818 [-4 .40]*** HHI -0.0106 [-5 .16]*** -0.0136 [-2.80 [-3 .59]*** -0.0002 [-3 .49]*** -0.0003 [-1 .78]* -0.0003 [-1.80 [-3 .48]*** -0.2527 [-4 .11]*** -0.2346 [-3 .28]*** -0.2609 [-3 .59]*** Notes: OLS and panel regressions are estimated for the stability of MSBs as a function of the concentration level. The dependent variable and other description are the same as Table  5 . All tests use robust standard errors and t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Competition and stability in the commercial bank industry
In this section, we examine whether the relationship between competition and stability is different between MSBs and commercial banks. Table 7 [-5 .77]*** -0.3989 [-5 .17]*** Inverse of Boone Index -1.0715 [-3 .43]*** -0.5305 [-2.45 [-6 .91]*** -0.0001 [-6 .64]*** -0.0001 [-2 .29]** -0.0001 [-2.18 [-6 .79]*** -0.4712 [-5 .14]*** Inverse of Boone Index -1.6732 [-6 .29]*** -1.1938 [-5.27 [-6 .41]*** -0.0001 [-5 .74]*** -0.0001 [-1 .82]* -0.0001 [-1.74 [-2 .22]** -0.4390 [-3 .65]*** -0.3248 [-3 .98]*** -0.4664 [-6.26 Notes: OLS and panel regressions are estimated for the stability of commercial banks. The dependent variable and other description are the same as Table 5 . All tests use robust standard errors and t/z-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
10)
We employ random effects models rather than fixed effects models for the panel analysis of Table 7 in order to estimate the effect of foreign banks (the dummy variable of Foreign). Note that fixed effects regressions do not provide estimates for time-invariant variables such as the Foreign. We also conduct fixed effects regressions and their results, as shown below, are similar to those of Table 7 which is driven by random effects models. More detailed results are available upon request. Meanwhile, most coefficients of our control variables are signed as expected except for the size of banks. Table 7 shows the negative effect of Ln(Assets) on bank stability. Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) point out that competition and bank size are endogenously determined and thus one may need to employ instrumental variable estimations. Without endogeneity corrections, they also report the negative effect of bank size. Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012) provide a possible explanation for this result that it is because of the negative relationship between capital ratio and bank size.
They argue that the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition, while greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks in the less competitive markets.
Additional analysis
So far, we use market shares calculated based on total assets. In this section, we re-estimate Boone indices using market shares of total loans in that competitive pressure is more intensified in loan markets than deposit markets. We also re-calculate market shares of commercial loans and household loans and see whether our results change.
In Table 8 , we alternatively estimate Boone indices using market shares based on total loans and re-examine the relationship between competition and stability in the MSB and commercial bank markets. The    with the ROAs for prior four quarters are used as the dependent variable. The results confirm our previous findings that the relationship between competition and stability varies depending on the types of banks. In Panel A (MSB case), the coefficients on Competition and Inverse of Boone Index are positive and significant, suggesting that, consistent with Table 5 and Table 6 , the competitive pressure enhances the stability of MSBs. Panel B (commercial bank case) reports that commercial banks are less vulnerable in less competitive markets, while the effect of competition is nonlinear. The results are consistent with Table 7 . Notes: Boone index is re-estimated using the market share based on total loans. OLS and panel regressions are estimated for the stability of both MSBs (Panel A) and commercial banks (Panel B) . The dependent variable and other description are the same as Table 5 . All tests use robust standard errors and t/z-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
In Table 9 Notes: Boone index is re-estimated using the market share based on commercial loans for MSBs and on household loans for commercial banks. OLS and panel regressions are estimated for the stability of both MSBs (Panel A) and commercial banks (Panel B) . The dependent variable and other description are the same as Table 5 . All tests use robust standard errors and t/z-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
V. Conclusion
There are two alternative hypotheses that relate bank competition to stability. The conventional competition-fragility theory suggests that the higher competition in financial industry causes financial institutions to lose their market powers, leading to a decrease in their profitability. In order to recover from those financial losses, individual financial institutions are more likely to invest in riskier portfolios. Consequently, this risk-taking behavior will undermine financial institutions' stability. One the other hand, competition-stability theory suggests that competition has a potentially positive effect on the stability of financial institutions. Accordingly, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that banks with greater market share in the loan market which experience lower competition tend to impose higher interest rates on their loans. The greater interest rate charged by banks in a less competitive market may increase the risk-taking behavior of borrowing firms. Boyd and De Nicolo consequently argue that since the risk is ultimately shifted from borrowers to banks, the default probability of banks gradually goes up in the riskiness of bank loans.
The recent study by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) support, in part, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) 's risk-shifting effect that greater interest rates in less competitive markets raise the risk of loans and thus make a bank bankruptcy more likely. They, however, additionally take into account the fact that greater interest rates also improve bank profitability, called the interest effect or margin effect, which is not considered in Boyd and De Nicolo. They suggest the U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. So far, empirical research has produced mixed results on the influence of bank competition on its stability.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between competition and stability by using the sample of two different types of Korean banks: MSBs and commercial banks. By doing so, we attempt to fill the gap in literature by examining whether differences in terms of governance structure, business models and regulatory treatments cause banks to interact with industry competition differently. It is generally known that the governance structure of MSBs is not transparent and their customers are mainly made up of borrowers with weaker debt servicing capacity than those of commercial banks. Also, the regulation for MSBs has not been relatively tightened compared to commercial banks.
We use quarterly panel data of MSBs and commercial banks from 1999, the end of Asian financial crisis, through 2011. We follow In addition to this, our empirical results generally support the hypothesis that the effect of bank competition on stability is different depending on the characteristics of banks. This is similar to the study of Liu and Wilson (2011) . They also find that competition enhances the stability of banks with lower stability levels, but has a negative impact on the stability of banks with higher stability levels in the Japanese banking market.
As Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) 
